| Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part39.utf8:145526130:1937 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part39.utf8:145526130:1937?format=raw |
LEADER: 01937cam a22002897a 4500
001 2011655806
003 DLC
005 20110330084530.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 110329s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2011655806
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aFryer, Roland G.
245 10 $aValuing identity$h[electronic resource] /$cRoland G. Fryer, Jr., Glenn Loury.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 16568
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/29/2011.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Affirmative action policies are practiced around the world. This paper explores the welfare economics of such policies. A model is proposed where heterogeneous agents, distinguished by skill level and social identity, compete for positions in a hierarchy. The problem of designing an efficient policy to raise the status in this competition of a disadvantaged identity group is considered. We show that: (i) when agent identity is fully visible and contractible (sightedness), efficient policy grants preferred access to positions, but offers no direct assistance for acquiring skills; and, (ii) when identity is not contractible (blindness), efficient policy provides universal subsidies when the fraction of the disadvantaged group at the development margin is larger then their mean (across positions) share at the assignment margin"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aLoury, Glenn C.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 16568.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w16568