MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02137cam a22002777a 4500
001 2011655720
003 DLC
005 20110108083601.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 110106s2010 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2011655720
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
245 00 $aCan militants use violence to win public support?$h[electronic resource]$bevidence from the second intifada /$cDavid A. Jaeger ... [et al.].
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2010.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 16475
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/6/2011.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper investigates whether attacks against Israeli targets help Palestinian factions gain public support. We link individual level survey data to the full list of Israeli fatalities during the period of the Second Intifada (2000-2006), and estimate a flexible discrete choice model for faction supported. We find some support for the "outbidding" hypothesis, the notion that Palestinian factions use violence to gain prestige and influence public opinion within the community. In particular, the two leading Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, gain in popularity following successful attacks against Israeli targets. Our results suggest, however, that most movement occurs within either the secular groups or the Islamist groups, and not between them. That is, Fatah's gains come at the expense of smaller secular factions while Hamas' gains come at the expense of smaller Islamic factions and the disaffected. In contrast, attacks by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad lower support for that faction"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aJaeger, David A.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 16475.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w16475