MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02158cam a22003494a 4500
001 2010655602
003 DLC
005 20100116094238.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 100114s2009 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2010655602
040 $aDLC$cDLC
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aK487.E3
100 1 $aBebchuk, Lucian A.
245 10 $aPaying for long-term performance$h[electronic resource] /$cLucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.
246 3 $aPaying for long term performance
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bHarvard Law School,$c[2009]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper,$x1045-6333;$vno. 658
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/14/2010.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Abstract: Firms and regulators around the world are now seeking to ensure that the compensation of public company executives is tied to long-term results to avoid creating incentives for excessive risk-taking. This paper analyzes how this objective can be best achieved. Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of executive pay packages, we identify how such compensation could be best structured to tie remuneration to long-term results rather than short-term gains that might turn out to be illusory. We also analyze how equity compensation could be best designed to prevent the gaming of equity grants at either the front-end or the back-end"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
530 $aAlso available in print.
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
650 0 $aExecutives$xSalaries, etc.$xLaw and legislation$zUnited States.
650 0 $aExecutives$xSalaries, etc.$zUnited States$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aFinancial risk.
650 0 $aRisk-taking (Psychology)$xEconomic aspects.
700 1 $aFried, Jesse M.
710 2 $aJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) ;$vno. 658.
856 40 $zView the PDF version of the paper at the School's website$uhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/658_Bebchuk.php