MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02079cam a22002897a 4500
001 2009656091
003 DLC
005 20091230084602.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 091201s2009 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2009656091
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aStaiger, Robert W.
245 10 $aInternational trade and domestic regulation$h[electronic resource] /$cRobert W. Staiger, Alan O. Sykes.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$c2009.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 15541
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 12/1/2009.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Existing formal models of the relationship between trade policy and regulatory policy suggest the potential for a regulatory race to the bottom. WTO rules and disputes, however, center on complaints about excessively stringent regulations. This paper bridges the gap between the existing formal literature and the actual pattern of rules and disputes. Employing the terms-of-trade framework for the modeling of trade agreements, we show how "large" nations may have an incentive to impose discriminatory product standards against imported goods once border instruments are constrained, and how inefficiently stringent standards may emerge under certain circumstances even if regulatory discrimination is prohibited. We then assess the WTO legal framework in light of our results, arguing that it does a reasonably thorough job of policing regulatory discrimination, but that it does relatively little to address excessive nondiscriminatory regulations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aSykes, A. O.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 15541.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w15541