MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02136cam a22003017a 4500
001 2009655863
003 DLC
005 20100106094203.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 100105s2009 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2009655863
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aLevitt, Steven D.
245 10 $aCheckmate$h[electronic resource] :$bexploring backward induction among chess players /$cSteven D. Levitt, John A. List, Sally E. Sadoff.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2009.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 15610
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/5/2010.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. Much of this evidence, however, is generated using the Centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing the theory. In this study, we analyze the play of world class chess players both in the centipede game and in another class of games - Race to 100 games - that are pure tests of backward induction. We find that world class chess players behave like student subjects in the centipede game, virtually never playing the backward induction equilibrium In the race to 100 games, in contrast, we find that many chess players properly backward induct. Consistent with our claim that the Centipede game is not a useful test of backward induction, we find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aList, John A.,$d1968-
700 1 $aSadoff, Sally E.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 15610.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w15610