Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:75734586:2224 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:75734586:2224?format=raw |
LEADER: 02224nam a22002777a 4500
001 2007619781
003 DLC
005 20071023084909.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 071022s2007 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2007619781
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aK487.E3
100 1 $aShavell, Steven.
245 10 $aOn optimal legal change, past behavior, and grandfathering$h[electronic resource] /$cSteven Shavell.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bHarvard Law School,$c[2007]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper,$x1045-6333;$vno. 599
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 10/22/2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"When is it socially advantageous for legal rules to be changed in the light of altered circumstances? In answering this basic question here, a simple point is developed -- that past compliance with legal rules tends to reduce the social advantages of legal change. The reasons are twofold: adjusting to a new legal rule often involves costs; and the social benefits of change are frequently only incremental, only in addition to those of past compliance. The general implications are that legal rules should be more stable than would be appropriate were the relevance of past behavior not recognized, and that a policy of grandfathering, namely, of permitting noncompliance, should sometimes be employed. The analysis of these points has broad relevance, applying across legal fields, often explaining what we observe but also indicating possibilities for reform, such as in the regulation of air pollution. The analysis is related to the conventional reliance-based justification for the stability of the law, the literature on legal transitions, and economic writing on optimal legal standards"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
710 2 $aJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) ;$vno. 599.
856 40 $uhttp://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin%5Fcenter/papers/599.php