Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:73270259:3025 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part35.utf8:73270259:3025?format=raw |
LEADER: 03025cam a22002897a 4500
001 2007616657
003 DLC
005 20071116085957.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 071115s2007 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2007616657
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aNiederle, Muriel.
245 14 $aThe effects of a centralized clearinghouse on job placement, wages, and hiring practices$h[electronic resource] /$cMuriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2007.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 13529
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 11/15/2007.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, programs hired fellows earlier each year, eventually almost a year earlier than when the match was operating. It became customary for GI program directors to make very short offers, rarely exceeding two weeks and often much shorter. Consequently many potential fellows had to accept positions before they finished their planned interviews, and most programs experienced cancellations of interviews they had scheduled. Furthermore, without a match, many programs hired more local fellows, and fewer from other hospitals and cities than they did during the match. Wages, however, seem not to have been affected. To restart the match, we proposed a policy, subsequently adopted by the gastroenterology professional organizations, that even if applicants had accepted offers prior to the match, they could subsequently decline those offers and participate in the match. This made it safe for programs to delay hiring until the match, confident that programs that did not participate would not be able to "capture" the most desirable candidates beforehand. Consequently it appears that most programs waited for the match in an orderly way in 2006, when the GI match was reinstated. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
700 1 $aRoth, Alvin E.,$d1951-
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 13529.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w13529