MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01757nam a22002777a 4500
001 2006619218
003 DLC
005 20060524090451.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 060524s2006 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2006619218
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aMas, Alexandre.
245 10 $aPay, reference points, and police performance$h[electronic resource] /$cAlexandre Mas.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2006.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 12202
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 5/24/2006.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These declines are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand. The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 12202.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/W12202