MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01953cam a22003017a 4500
001 2006618456
003 DLC
005 20061011103853.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 060818s2006 gw sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2006618456
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dWaU
043 $as-pe---
050 00 $aHD5701
100 1 $aHunt, Jennifer.
245 10 $aHow corruption hits people when they are down$h[electronic resource] /$cby Jennifer Hunt.
260 $aBonn, Germany :$bIZA,$c[2006]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper ;$vno. 2278
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 8/18/2006.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Using cross-country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
650 0 $aPolitical corruption$zPeru.
650 0 $aVictims of crimes$zPeru.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;$vno. 2278
856 40 $uhttp://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=2278