| Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:75680436:2276 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:75680436:2276?format=raw |
LEADER: 02276cam a22003377a 4500
001 2005620573
003 DLC
005 20051212111927.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 051207s2005 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005620573
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aEdelman, Benjamin.
245 10 $aInternet advertising and the generalized second price auction$h[electronic resource] :$bselling billions of dollars worth of keywords /$cBenjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2005.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 11765
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 12/7/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We investigate the "generalized second price" auction (GSP), a new mechanism which is used by search engines to sell online advertising that most Internet users encounter daily. GSP is tailored to its unique environment, and neither the mechanism nor the environment have previously been studied in the mechanism design literature. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. In particular, unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP in a dynamic environment, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to the GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium that results in the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aInternet advertising.
650 0 $aInternet advertising$xRates.
650 0 $aInternet auctions.
700 1 $aOstrovsky, Michael.
700 1 $aSchwarz, Michael,$d1970-
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 11765.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/W11765