Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:72256657:2139 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:72256657:2139?format=raw |
LEADER: 02139cam a22002897a 4500
001 2005617556
003 DLC
005 20050520152314.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050520s2005 dcu sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2005617556
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHG1
100 1 $aCarlson, Mark A.$q(Mark Arnold),$d1950-
245 10 $aBranch banking, bank competition, and financial stability$h[electronic resource] /$cMark Carlson and Kris James Mitchener.
260 $aWashington, D.C. :$bFederal Reserve Board,$c[2005]
490 1 $aFinance and economics discussion series ;$v2005-20
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 5/20/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"It is often argued that branching stabilizes banking systems by facilitating diversification of bank portfolios; however, previous empirical research on the Great Depression offers mixed support for this view. Analyses using state-level data find that states allowing branch banking had lower failure rates, while those examining individual banks find that branch banks were more likely to fail. We argue that an alternative hypothesis can reconcile these seemingly disparate findings. Using data on national banks from the 1920s and 1930s, we show that branch banking increases competition and forces weak banks to exit the banking system. This consolidation strengthens the system as a whole without necessarily strengthening the branch banks themselves. Our empirical results suggest that the effects that branching had on competition were quantitatively more important than geographical diversification for bank stability in the 1920s and 1930s"--Federal Reserve Board web site.
653 $aBranching banking;$abank consolidation;$afinancial stability;$agreat depression
700 1 $aMitchener, Kris James
830 0 $aFinance and economics discussion series (Online) ;$v2005-20.
856 40 $uhttp://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2005/200520/200520abs.html