MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01975cam a22003137a 4500
001 2005617347
003 DLC
005 20050415172525.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050413s2004 pau sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2005617347
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHG186.G7
100 1 $aHaldane, Andrew G.
245 10 $aIMF lending and creditor moral hazard$h[electronic resource] /$cby Andrew G. Haldane and Jörg Scheibe.
260 $aLondon :$bBank of England,$cc2004.
490 1 $aWorking paper,$x1368-5562 ;$vno. 216
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 4/13/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Existing empirical evidence on the effects of IMF intervention on debtor and creditor incentives - so-called moral hazard - is mixed. A new test of creditor moral hazard is developed which uses some new data and some more stringent identifying restrictions. The test examines the response of the market valuation of UK banks to IMF loan packages. It finds a significant positive response for UK banks, with abnormal returns of over 1% in a number of cases. These excess returns are greater, the larger is the IMF package and the larger is the size of the creditor banks' emerging market portfolio. This effect is significant even once the potentially welfare-enhancing effect of IMF loans in offsetting overpricing problems in international capital markets is controlled for. In short, concrete evidence is found of creditor-side moral hazard associated with IMF support"--Bank of England web site.
650 0 $aMoral hazard.
610 20 $aInternational Monetary Fund.
700 1 $aScheibe, Jörg.
710 1 $aBank of England.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Bank of England : Online) ;$vno.216.
856 40 $uhttp://www.bankofengland.co.uk/workingpapers/wpabst04.htm