Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-027.mrc:75911334:3432 |
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050 4 $aHQ519$b.C46 2017
082 04 $a306.85$223
100 1 $aChiappori, Pierre-André,$eauthor.
245 10 $aMatching with transfers :$bthe economics of love and marriage /$cPierre-André Chiappori.
264 1 $aPrinceton :$bPrinceton University Press,$c[2017]
264 4 $c©2017
300 $axvi, 241 pages :$billustrations ;$c25 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aThe Gorman Lectures in Economics
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 227-234) and index.
505 0 $aIntroduction : Matching Models in Economics -- Matching with Transfers : Basic Notions -- Matching under Transferable Utility : Theory -- Matching by Categories -- Matching under Transferable Utility : Some Extensions -- Matching under Transferable Utility : Applications -- Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility -- Conclusion.
520 $aOver the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.--$cProvided by Publisher.
650 0 $aFamilies$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aMarriage$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aMatching theory.
650 7 $aFamilies$xEconomic aspects.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01728871
650 7 $aMarriage$xEconomic aspects.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01010463
650 7 $aMatching theory.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01011671
650 7 $aMatching-Problem$2gnd$0(DE-588)4198185-6
650 7 $aPartnerwahl$2gnd$0(DE-588)4044795-9
650 7 $aEhe$2gnd$0(DE-588)4013630-9
650 7 $aFamilienökonomie$2gnd$0(DE-588)4123185-5
650 7 $aVerhaltensökonomie$2gnd$0(DE-588)7751254-6
830 0 $aGorman lectures in economics.
852 00 $bbar$hHQ519$i.C46 2017