MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 02842cam a2200445 i 4500
001 5805491
005 20210305100047.0
006 m o d
007 cr |n|||||||||
008 060901s2007 dcua ob 000 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm85215532
040 $aZCU$beng$erda$cZCU$dOCLCQ$dOCLCF$dOCLCO$dOCL$dOCLCQ$dOCL$dZCU
035 $a(OCoLC)85215532
043 $aa-iq---
050 4 $aDS79.769
049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aCordesman, Anthony H.,$eauthor.
245 10 $aIraqi force development :$bcan Iraqi forces do the job? /$cAnthony Cordesman ; with the assistance of Adam Mausner ... [and four others]
264 1 $aWashington, D.C. :$bCSIS,$c[2007]
300 $a1 online resource (xxxix, 828 pages) :$billustrations
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
500 $a"Revised, May 10, 2007."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references
588 $aViewed on (Sept. 1, 2006).
520 $aExperts disagree on many aspects of the Iraq War, including the ways which American strategic mistakes led to the initial failures in creating effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces. There is little disagreement, however, over the fact the US should have done more in its invasion planning, during the invasion, and in the year that followed, to conduct stability operations, nation building, and establish security. There is also broad agreement among most analysts who have examined the way in which the US went to war in Iraq, and dealt with its Coalition allies and Iraqi exile groups, that the US failed to anticipate the threat of terrorism and insurgency. The Bush Administration planned for success. It did not accurately assess the problems an invasion would create in political, economic, social, and religious terms. It ignored warnings about the risk of ethnic and sectarian divisions, the need for large forces to secure the country, and the risk of "postwar" terrorism and insurgency. It saw the removal of Saddam Hussein as enough of a grand strategic goal, and did not see the need for a massive effort at stability operations and nation building.
650 0 $aIraq War, 2003-2011.
650 0 $aPostwar reconstruction$zIraq.
651 0 $aIraq$xArmed Forces.
650 0 $aNational security$zIraq.
650 7 $aArmed Forces.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00814586
650 7 $aPostwar reconstruction.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01200084
651 7 $aIraq.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01205757
647 7 $aIraq War$d(2003-2011)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01802311
648 7 $a2003-2011$2fast
700 1 $aMausner, Adam,$eauthor.
710 2 $aCenter for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.),$eissuing body.
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio5805491
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS