MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 03088pam a22003494a 4500
001 5284233
005 20221110011201.0
008 040726t20052005nju b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2004053451
015 $aGBA509342
020 $a0691113750 (hardcover : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm56111757
035 $a(NNC)5284233
035 $a5284233
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dUKM$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
050 00 $aBD418.3$b.K55 2005
082 00 $a128/.2$222
100 1 $aKim, Jaegwon.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78038667
245 10 $aPhysicalism, or something near enough /$cJaegwon Kim.
260 $aPrinceton, N.J. :$bPrinceton University Press,$c[2005], ©2005.
300 $axiii, 186 pages ;$c22 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aPrinceton monographs in philosophy
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [175]-180) and index.
505 00 $gCh. 1.$tMental causation and consciousness : our two mind-body problems -- $gCh. 2.$tThe supervenience argument motivated, clarified, and defended -- $gCh. 3.$tThe rejection of immaterial minds : a causal argument -- $gCh. 4.$tReduction, reductive explanation, and closing the "gap" -- $gCh. 5.$tExplanatory arguments for type physicalism and why they don't work -- $gCh. 6.$tPhysicalism, or something near enough.
520 1 $a"Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible?" "Mind-body reduction is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena is reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost." "According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aPhilosophy of mind.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89004340
650 0 $aMind and body.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085488
830 0 $aPrinceton monographs in philosophy.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n99037617
852 00 $bglx$hBD418.3$i.K55 2005