| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-009.mrc:192284593:2496 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
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LEADER: 02496cam a22003134a 4500
001 4183499
005 20221027051341.0
008 021009t20032003nyu b 001 0 eng
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035 $a(OCoLC)ocm50802605
035 $a(NNC)4183499
035 $a4183499
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dUKM$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
050 00 $aBJ1461$b.C53 2003
082 00 $a123/.5$221
100 1 $aClarke, Randolph K.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/nr90006375
245 10 $aLibertarian accounts of free will /$cRandolph Clarke.
260 $aNew York :$bOxford University Press,$c[2003], ©2003.
300 $axv, 244 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 223-233) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tIncompatibilism -- $g2.$tActive Control and Causation -- $g3.$tEvent-Causal Accounts and the Problem of Explanation -- $g4.$tDeliberative Libertarian Accounts -- $g5.$tThe Problem of Diminished Control -- $g6.$tThe Problem of Value -- $g7.$tThe Freedom of Decisions and Other Actions -- $g8.$tAn Integrated Agent-Causal Account -- $g9.$tAgent Causation and Control -- $g10.$tSubstance and Cause -- $gApp.$tPhysicalism and Agent Causation.
520 1 $a"In this comprehensive study, Randolph Clarke examines libertarian accounts. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, he defends a type of event-causal view - one on which a free action must be non-deterministically caused by its immediate causal antecedents - from the charges concerning rationality and diminished control. Clarke subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. He then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and non-deterministic event causation." "Clarke defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. He concludes that if a broad thesis of compatibilism is correct - one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism - then no libertarian account is entirely adequate."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aFree will and determinism.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85051686
852 00 $bglx$hBJ1461$i.C53 2003