| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-007.mrc:98668522:3565 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-007.mrc:98668522:3565?format=raw |
LEADER: 03565mam a2200409 a 4500
001 3079271
005 20221019213313.0
008 010514t20012001maua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2001033807
020 $a0792373596 (alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)46992089
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm46992089
035 $a(CStRLIN)DCLC2001033807-B
035 $9ATQ3723CU
035 $a(NNC)3079271
035 $a3079271
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
043 $ae------
050 00 $aJC330$b.P695 2001
082 00 $a306.2$221
245 00 $aPower indices and coalition formation /$cedited by Manfred J. Holler and Guillermo Owen.
260 $aBoston, MA :$bKluwer Academic,$c[2001], ©2001.
300 $avi, 386 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $tWhy Power Indices and Coalition Formation? /$rManfred J. Holler and Guillermo Owen --$tAn Average Value Function for Cooperative Games /$rVladimir Akimov and William Kerby --$tExtended Probabilistic Characterization of Power Indices /$rMatthias Brueckner --$tAxiomatics of Level Structure Values /$rFrederic Chantreuil --$tValues for Multialternative Games and Multilinear Extensions /$rRie Ono --$tModels and Reality: The Curious Case of the Absent Abstention /$rDan S. Felsenthal and Moshe Machover --$tGlobal Monotonicity of Values of Cooperative Games: An Argument Supporting the Explanatory Power of Shapley's Approach /$rRene Levinsky and Peter Silarszky --$tOn the Probabilistic Relationship Between the Public Good Index and the Normalized Banzhaf Index /$rMika Widgren --$tA Note on the Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index (PGI) /$rStefan Napel --$tPower, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures /$rRafel Amer and Francesc Carreras --
505 80 $tEqual Treatment for Both Sides of Assignment Games in the Modified Least Core /$rPeter Sudholter --$tOn Small Coalitions, Hierarchic Decision Making and Collective Competence /$rSven Berg --$tAn Axiomatic Approach to Probabilistic Efficient Values for Cooperative Games /$rTadeusz Radzik and Theo Driessen --$tSet Games /$rHarry Aarts, Yukihiko Funaki and Kees Hoede --$tVoting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures /$rAnnick Laruelle and Mika Widgren --$tDecisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choice of European Voting Rules /$rThomas Konig and Thomas Brauninger --$tCalculus of Consent in the EU Council of Ministers /$rHannu Nurmi, Tommi Meskanen and Antti Pajala --$tCoalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union /$rMadeleine O. Hosli --$tVoting Power in the European Central Bank /$rMatthias Brueckner --$tPower Indices and the Design of Electoral/Constitutional Systems /$rRon J. Johnston --
505 80 $tImplementing Democracy in Indirect Voting Processes: the Knesset Case /$rAnnick Laruelle --$tIndex of Power for Cabinet /$rJacek W. Mercik.
650 0 $aPower (Social sciences)$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85105976
650 0 $aCoalitions.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85027419
650 0 $aPolitical science$xDecision making.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85104442
610 20 $aEuropean Union$xDecision making.
700 1 $aHoller, Manfred Joseph,$d1946-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79133960
700 1 $aOwen, Guillermo.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82032479
852 00 $bleh$hJC330$i.P695 2001