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MARC Record from marc_columbia

Record ID marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-007.mrc:48528585:3479
Source marc_columbia
Download Link /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-007.mrc:48528585:3479?format=raw

LEADER: 03479mam a2200373 a 4500
001 3038115
005 20221019203015.0
008 000901s2001 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 00045551
020 $a0521802296
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm44972128
035 $9ATK0313CU
035 $a(NNC)3038115
035 $a3038115
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dC#P$dNNC$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
050 00 $aK474.M87$bA36 2001
082 00 $a340/.112$221
100 1 $aMurphy, Mark C.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n89670331
245 10 $aNatural law and practical rationality /$cMark C. Murphy.
260 $aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2001.
300 $axiv, 284 pages ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aCambridge studies in philosophy and law
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [271]-278) and index.
505 00 $tIntroduction: Natural Law and the Theory of Practical Rationality --$g1.$tThe Real Identity Thesis.$g1.1.$tRival Views of How Goods Are Known.$g1.2.$tFunctioning and Flourishing.$g1.3.$tKnowledge of Human Flourishing.$g1.4.$tThe Real Identity Thesis --$g2.$tWell-Being.$g2.1.$tNatural Law Theory as Welfarist and Objectivist.$g2.2.$tThe Refutation of Conceptual Subjectivism.$g2.3.$tThe Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory as the Best Version of Strong Subjectivism.$g2.4.$tThe Refutation of Strong Subjectivism.$g2.5.$tThe Refutation of Weak Subjectivism.$g2.6.$t'Objective List' Theories --$g3.$tThe Reasons That Make Action Intelligible.$g3.1.$tThe List of Goods.$g3.2.$tPleasure and Pain.$g3.3.$tThe Basic Goods.$g3.4.$tInner Peace, Happiness, and the Hybrid View of the Nature of Well-Being.$g3.5.$tThe Real Identity Thesis Revisited --$g4.$tWelfarism and Its Discontents.$g4.1.$tWelfarism in the Theory of Practical Rationality.$g4.2.$tWelfarism Does Not Imply Egoism.
505 80 $g4.3.$tWelfarism Does Not Imply a Maximizing Theory of Rationality.$g4.4.$tWelfarism Does Not Imply Promotionism --$g5.$tThe Principles That Make Choice Reasonable.$g5.1.$tA Justificatory Framework for Principles of Practical Reasonableness.$g5.2.$tEgoism, Consequentialism, Kantianism.$g5.3.$tThe Nature of Reasons for Action.$g5.4.$tA Note on Hierarchy among the Basic Goods.$g5.5.$tPrinciples of Practical Reasonableness Governing Plans of Action.$g5.6.$tPrinciples of Practical Reasonableness Governing Agents.$g5.7.$tVirtue Theory --$g6.$tWhat Ought to Be Done.$g6.1.$t'Ought'.$g6.2.$tThe Moral 'Ought'.$g6.3.$tHow Practical Reason Can Err.$g6.4.$tMoral Dilemmas.$g6.5.$tPositive Norms, Life Plans, and the Partial Constitution Thesis.$g6.6.$tNormative Openness and Natural Law Theories of Authority.
520 1 $a"Natural Law and Practical Rationality is a defense of a contemporary natural law theory of practical rationality, exhibiting its inherent plausibility and engaging systematically with rival egoist, consequentialist, Kantian, and virtue accounts. It will be of interest to professionals and students of moral philosophy, the philosophy of law, and political theory."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aNatural law.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85090244
650 0 $aReason.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85111788
650 0 $aRationalism.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85111520
830 0 $aCambridge studies in philosophy and law.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n88501651
852 00 $bglx$hK474.M87$iA36 2001