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MARC Record from marc_columbia

Record ID marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-005.mrc:297953772:3257
Source marc_columbia
Download Link /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-005.mrc:297953772:3257?format=raw

LEADER: 03257mam a2200397 a 4500
001 2233659
005 20220615235431.0
008 980504t19981998mau b 001 0 eng
010 $a 98024346
020 $a0262112345 (hardcover : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm39122721
035 $9ANW4931CU
035 $a(NNC)2233659
035 $a2233659
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aBD418.3$b.K53 1998
082 00 $a128/.2$221
100 1 $aKim, Jaegwon.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78038667
245 10 $aMind in a physical world :$ban essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation /$cJaegwon Kim.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c[1998], ©1998.
300 $aviii, 146 pages ;$c21 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aRepresentation and mind
500 $a"A Bradford book."
500 $aBook consists of four revised lectures given by the author as the Townsend Lectures at the University of California, Berkeley, in Mar. 1996.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [135]-139) and index.
505 00 $gCh. 1.$tThe Mind-Body Problem: Where We Now Are.$tSupervenience, Realization, and Emergence.$tSupervenience Is Not a Mind-Body Theory.$tThe Layered Model and Mereological Supervenience.$tPhysical Realizationism.$tPhysical Realizationism Explains Mind-Body Supervenience --$gCh. 2.$tThe Many Problems of Mental Causation.$tThree Problems of Mental Causation.$tThe Supervenience Argument, or Descartes's Revenge.$tSearle, Fodor, and the Supervenience Argument.$tBlock's Worries about Second-Order Properties --$gCh. 3.$tMental Causation: The Backlash and Free Lunches.$tUnavoidability of Metaphysics: The Exclusion Problem.$tDo Counterfactuals Help?$t"Program Explanation" and Supervenient Causation.$tDoes the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?$tProperties: "Levels" and "Orders" --$gCh. 4.$tReduction and Reductionism: A New Look.$tNagel Reduction: Troubles with "Bridge Laws"$tThe Functional Model of Reduction.$tFunctional Properties versus Functional Concepts.$tMultiple Realization Again.
505 80 $tThe Supervenience Argument Revisited.$tThe Options: Good News and Bad News.
520 $aThis book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind - in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem.
520 8 $aArguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction.
650 0 $aPhilosophy of mind.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89004340
650 0 $aMind and body.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085488
650 0 $aCausation.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85021459
830 0 $aRepresentation and mind.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n90642950
852 00 $bglx$hBD418.3$i.K53 1998