MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 02256cam a22004934a 4500
001 53831545
003 OCoLC
005 20151005044340.0
008 031202s2004 dcua b 001 0 eng
010 $a2003026258
020 $a0815781520 (cloth : alk. paper)
035 $a53831545
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dUtOrBLW
042 $apcc
043 $an-us---
049 $aSFRA
050 00 $aHG2491$b.S74 2004
082 00 $a332.1/2$222
092 $a332.12$bSt456t
100 1 $aStern, Gary H.
245 10 $aToo big to fail :$bthe hazards of bank bailouts /$cGary H. Stern, Ron J. Feldman.
260 $aWashington, D.C. :$bBrookings Institution Press,$cc2004.
300 $axiii, 230 p. :$bill. ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 197-222) and index.
505 0 $aIntroduction : our message and methods -- What is the problem? -- Why protection is costly -- How pervasive is TBTF? -- Why protect TBTF creditors? -- The growth of TBTF protection -- Testing our thesis : the cases of not too big to fail -- Can the problem be addressed? -- Creating the necessary foundation -- Reducing policymakers' uncertainty -- Limiting creditor losses -- Restricting payment system spillovers -- Alternatives for managing too big to fail -- Summary : talking points on too big to fail.
650 0 $aBank failures$zUnited States.
650 0 $aBank failures$xGovernment policy$zUnited States.
650 0 $aBanks and banking$xState supervision.
650 0 $aIntervention (Federal government)
700 1 $aFeldman, Ron J.
907 $a.b19105848$b12-20-18$c11-16-04
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957 00 $aOCLC reclamation of 2017-18
907 $a.b19105848$b12-03-14$c11-16-04
956 $aPre-reclamation 001 value: ocm53831545
975 $aSFR
994 $aX0$bSFR
998 $axbt$b06-21-07$cm$da$e-$feng$gdcu$h0$i2
999 $yMARS
998 $axbt$b02-01-05$cm$da$e-$feng$gdcu$h0$i0
945 $a332.12$bSt456t$d - - $e05-21-2018 13:41$f0$g0$h06-29-18$i31223068596056$j141$0800$k - - $lxbtci$o-$p$32.95$q-$r-$s- $t0$u13$v11$w0$x1$y.i4033112x$z03-08-05