MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 02175cam a2200337 i 4500
001 2012021023
003 DLC
005 20130627074943.0
008 120522s2013 enk b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2012021023
020 $a9781107031739 (hardback)
020 $a9781107649958 (paperback)
040 $aDLC$beng$cDLC$erda$dDLC
042 $apcc
050 00 $aJF1051$b.E47 2013
082 00 $a302.3$223
084 $aPOL010000$2bisacsh
100 1 $aElster, Jon,$d1940-$eauthor.
245 10 $aSecurities against misrule :$bjuries, assemblies, elections /$cby Jon Elster.
260 $aCambridge ;$aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2013.
300 $axii, 324 pages ;$c25 cm
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
520 $a"This book proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social-choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham,Ŵs views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies, and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics, and law"--$cProvided by publisher.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 289-313) and index.
650 0 $aRepresentative government and representation$xDecision making.
650 0 $aGroup decision making.
650 0 $aAbuse of administrative power$xPrevention.
600 10 $aBentham, Jeremy,$d1748-1832.
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory.$2bisacsh