MARC record from Internet Archive

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020 $a9780472103294
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050 00 $aJK1331$b.P37 1992
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100 1 $aParker, Glenn R.,$d1946-
245 10 $aInstitutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress :$ban economic interpretation /$cGlenn R. Parker.
260 $aAnn Arbor :$bUniversity of Michigan Press,$c©1992.
300 $a118 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 109-114) and indexes.
520 $aInstitutional Change, Discretion, and the Making of Modern Congress challenges the widely accepted assumption that legislators, if not all politicians, are driven by the desire to be reelected. Through a series of creative arguments drawing on rational choice theory and microeconomics, political scientist Glenn R. Parker offers a controversial alternative to the reelection assumption: he posits that legislators seek to maximize their own discretion--the freedom to do what they want to do. Parker uses this premise to account for the behavior of legislatures, the organization of Congress, the emergence of policy outcomes that reveal legislator altruism as well as parochialism, and the evolution of Congress as a political institution. Legislators behave like monopolists, argues Parker, creating barriers to entry that prevent competitive challenges to their reelection and ultimately increasing their discretion. Parker uses this premise to explain basic historical patterns in the evolution of Congress, from the lengthening of congressional terms of service to the unusual expansion in the number of committee assignments held by members of Congress.
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650 0 $aLegislators$zUnited States.
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650 7 $aAbgeordneter$2gnd
650 7 $aMikroökonomie$2gnd
650 7 $aPolitisches Verhalten$2gnd
650 7 $aRationale Erwartung$2gnd
650 7 $aWirtschaftstheorie$2gnd
650 07 $aAbgeordneter.$2swd
650 07 $aMikroökonomie.$2swd
650 07 $aPolitisches Verhalten.$2swd
650 07 $aRationale Erwartung.$2swd
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653 0 $aLegislative$aEconomic aspects
653 0 $aLegislators$aUnited States
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776 08 $iOnline version:$aParker, Glenn R., 1946-$tInstitutional change, discretion, and the making of modern Congress.$dAnn Arbor : University of Michigan Press, ©1992$w(OCoLC)636986038
856 41 $3Table of contents$uhttp://www.gbv.de/dms/bowker/toc/9780472103294.pdf
856 41 $3Table of contents$uhttp://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=003698443&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
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