MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 04510cam 2200769 a 4500
001 ocm18071967
003 OCoLC
005 20200927002004.0
008 880525s1989 txua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 88016082
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019 $a988403047$a1171085322
020 $a0890963258$q(alk. paper)
020 $a9780890963258$q(alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)18071967$z(OCoLC)988403047$z(OCoLC)1171085322
050 00 $aHB846.8$b.B79 1989
082 00 $a302/.13$219
084 $a83.13$2bcl
084 $aQB 910$2rvk
084 $aQE 300$2rvk
084 $aQC 160$2rvk
100 1 $aBuchanan, James M.
245 10 $aExplorations into constitutional economics /$cJames M. Buchanan ; compiled and with a preface by Robert D. Tollison and Viktor J. Vanberg.
250 $a1st ed.
260 $aCollege Station :$bTexas A & M University Press,$c©1989.
300 $ax, 437 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aTexas A & M University economics series ;$vno. 9
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $tTheoretical Foundations: The Constitutional Paradigm --$tPredictive Power and the Choice among Regimes --$tThe Achievement and Limits of Public Choice in Diagnosing Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform --$tRational Choice Models in the Social Sciences --$tMan and the State --$tConstitutional Economics --$tApplications --$tVoting --$tToward a Theory of Yes-No Voting --$tWhat If There Is No Majority Motion? --$tVoter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives --$tVote Buying in a Stylized Setting --$tMonetary and Fiscal Constitution --$tPredictability: The Criterion of Monetary Constitutions --$tAn Outside Economist's Defense of Pesek and Saving --$tCan Policy Activism Succeed? --$tIdeas, Institutions, and Political Economy: A Plea for Disestablishment --$tPublic Goods Supply --$tThe Evaluation of Public Services --$tA Note on Public Goods Supply --$tBreton and Weldon on Public Goods --$tPublic Goods in Theory and Practice --$tConvexity Constraints in Public Goods Theory --$tTaxation and Public Debt --$tFiscal Choice through Time: A Case for Indirect Taxation? --$tEfficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility --$tTax Instruments as Constraints on the Disposition of Public Revenues --$tDialogues Concerning Fiscal Religion --$tProportional and Progressive Income Taxation with Utility-maximizing Governments --$tCoercive Taxation in Constitutional Contract --$tOrganization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt --$tProperty Rights and Externalities --$tPrivate Ownership and Common Usage.
650 0 $aSocial choice.
650 7 $aSocial choice.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01122336
650 7 $aChoix collectif.$2ram
650 07 $aAufsatzsammlung.$2swd
650 07 $aKollektiventscheidung.$2swd
650 07 $aPolitische Ökonomie.$2swd
650 07 $aVolkswirtschaftslehre.$2swd
650 07 $aKollektiventscheidung.$0(DE-588)4022393-0$2gnd
650 07 $aVolkswirtschaftslehre.$0(DE-588)4078943-3$2gnd
650 07 $aWirtschaft.$0(DE-588)4066399-1$2gnd
650 07 $aWirtschaftsverfassung.$0(DE-588)4190079-0$2gnd
653 0 $aSocial choice
655 4 $aAufsatzsammlung.
700 1 $aTollison, Robert D.
700 1 $aVanberg, Viktor.
776 08 $iOnline version:$aBuchanan, James M.$tExplorations into constitutional economics.$b1st ed.$dCollege Station : Texas A & M University Press, ©1989$w(OCoLC)654425158
830 0 $aTexas A & M University economics series ;$vno. 9.
856 41 $3Table of contents$uhttp://www.gbv.de/dms/bowker/toc/9780890963258.pdf
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948 $hNO HOLDINGS IN P4A - 453 OTHER HOLDINGS