MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 03933cam 2200793 a 4500
001 ocm33818658
003 OCoLC
005 20200623072952.0
008 951107s1996 mau b 001 0 eng
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020 $a9780262121972$q(hardcover ;$qalk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)33818658$z(OCoLC)36120743
050 00 $aB808.9$b.L83 1996
060 00 $a1997 E-034
060 10 $aB 808.9$bL981c 1996
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084 $aCC 4400$2rvk
084 $aCC 6600$2rvk
084 $a126
100 1 $aLycan, William G.
245 10 $aConsciousness and experience /$cWilliam G. Lycan.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c1996.
300 $axviii, 211 pages ;$c21 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 160-204) and index.
505 0 $a1. Introduction: What Is "The" Problem of Consciousness? -- 2. Concious Awareness as Internal Monitoring -- 3. The Subjectivity of the Mental -- 4. Qualia Strictly So Called -- 5. A Limited Defense of Phenomenal Information -- 6. Strange Qualia -- 7. Peacocke's Arguments.
520 $aThis sequel to Lycan's Conciousness (1987) continues the elaboration of his general functionalist theory of conciousness, answers critics of his earlier work, and expands the range of discussion to deal with the many new issues and arguments that have arisen in the intervening years, an extraordinarily fertile period for the philosophical investigation of conciousness.
520 8 $aLycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the structure of the mind; he also targets the set of really hard problems at the center of the theory of consciousness: subjectivity, qualia, and the felt aspect of experience. The key to his own enlarged and fairly argued position, which he calls the "hegemony of representation," is that there is no more to mind or conciousness than can be accounted for in terms of intentionality, functional organization, and, in particular, second-order representation of one's own mental states.
650 0 $aConsciousness.
650 0 $aExperience.
650 1 $aExperience.
650 12 $aConsciousness.
650 22 $aAwareness.
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650 07 $aErfahrung.$2swd
653 0 $aConsciousness
856 41 $3Table of contents$uhttp://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=007427537&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
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