MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 03099cam 22004334a 4500
001 9925151312301661
005 20210622124234.0
008 140312s2012 enka b 001 0 eng
010 $a2011030961
016 7 $a016126266$2Uk
016 7 $a101613650$2DNLM
019 $a794040192
020 $a9780195314595 (hardcover : alk. paper)
020 $a019531459X (hardcover : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)746154069
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn746154069
040 $aDLC$beng$cDLC$dBTCTA$dUKMGB$dOCLCO$dYDXCP$dPSC$dBWX$dCOO$dGZM$dIG#$dSTF$dMYG$dBET$dZLM$dXII$dOCLCF$dNLM
042 $apcc
049 $aCNUM
050 00 $aB105.C477$bP75 2012
060 00 $a2013 H-335
060 10 $aWL 705
082 00 $a153$223
100 1 $aPrinz, Jesse J.
245 14 $aThe conscious brain :$bhow attention engenders experience /$cJesse J. Prinz.
260 $aOxford ;$aNew York :$bOxford University Press,$cc2012.
300 $axiii, 397 p. :$bill. ;$c25 cm.
490 1 $aPhilosophy of mind series
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 345-383) and index.
505 0 $aDo we really need another theory of consciousness? -- Where is consciousness? : the intermediate level -- When are we conscious? : attention and availability -- How is consciousness realized? : gamma vectorwaves -- Which states can be conscious? : cognitive qualia reduced -- Why are we conscious? : action without enaction -- Whose consciousness? : the illusory self -- Whence the unity of consciousness? : attentional resonance -- What is consciousness? : neurofunctionalism -- Could consciousness be physical? : the brain maintained -- Conclusion : AIR compared.
520 $a"Prinz's account of consciousness makes two main claims: first consciousness always arises at a particular stage of perceptual processing, the intermediate level, and, second, consciousness depends on attention. Attention changes the flow of information allowing perceptual information to access memory systems. Neurobiologically, this change in flow depends on synchronized neural firing. Neural synchrony is also implicated in the unity of consciousness and in the temporal duration of experience. Prinz also explores the limits of consciousness. We have no direct experience of our thoughts, no experience of motor commands, and no experience of a conscious self. All consciousness is perceptual, and it functions to make perceptual information available to systems that allows for flexible behavior. Prinz concludes by discussing prevailing philosophical puzzles. He provides a neuroscientifically grounded response to the leading argument for dualism, and argues that materialists need not choose between functional and neurobiological approaches, but can instead combine these into neurofunctional response to the mind-body problem." -- Book jacket.
650 0 $aConsciousness.
650 0 $aExperience.
650 0 $aAttention.
830 0 $aPhilosophy of mind series.
947 $fHUMANITIES$hBOOK$p$34.36$q1
949 $aB105.C477 P75 2012$i31786102884787
949 $aEbook Dup Report 2 B
994 $a92$bCNU