MARC record from Internet Archive

LEADER: 05362cam a2200577Ia 4500
001 14708691
005 20210607113057.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
008 070501s2004 ne a ob 001 0 eng d
010 $z 2003049531
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn123907455
035 $a(NNC)14708691
040 $aN$T$beng$epn$cN$T$dOCLCQ$dMERUC$dUBY$dOCLCQ$dIDEBK$dOCLCQ$dOCLCF$dTYFRS$dYDXCP$dOCLCQ$dE7B$dREDDC$dOCLCQ$dLOA$dAGLDB$dCOCUF$dOCLCQ$dICG$dSTF$dD6H$dWRM$dVNS$dOCLCQ$dVTS$dOCLCQ$dG3B$dUKAHL$dOCLCQ$dK6U$dUKCRE$dYDX
019 $a441775406$a648175661$a999744594$a1007566698$a1037737372$a1038681145$a1153472530
020 $a9780080472126$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a0080472125$q(electronic bk.)
020 $z0750655100$q(Paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)123907455$z(OCoLC)441775406$z(OCoLC)648175661$z(OCoLC)999744594$z(OCoLC)1007566698$z(OCoLC)1037737372$z(OCoLC)1038681145$z(OCoLC)1153472530
050 4 $aHV675$b.W48 2004eb
072 7 $aHEA$x021000$2bisacsh
082 04 $a363.1/065$222
049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aWhittingham, R. B.$q(Robert B.)
245 14 $aThe blame machine :$bwhy human error causes accidents /$cRobert B. Whittingham.
260 $aAmsterdam ;$aBoston :$bElsevier Butterworth-Heinemann,$c2004.
300 $a1 online resource (xiv, 271 pages) :$billustrations
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $aCover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Part I Understanding human error -- 1 To err is human -- 1.1 Defining human error -- 1.2 Random and systemic errors -- References -- 2 Errors in practice -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Genotypes and phenotypes -- 2.3 The skill, rule and knowledge taxonomy -- 2.4 The generic error modelling system taxonomy -- References -- 3 Latent errors and violations -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Latent and active errors -- 3.3 Violations -- References -- 4 Human reliability analysis -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Measuring human reliability -- 4.3 Human reliability methods -- 4.4 Task decomposition -- 4.5 Error identification -- References -- 5 Human error modelling -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Basic probability theory -- 5.3 Error recovery -- 5.4 Error dependency -- References -- 6 Human error in event sequences -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Human reliability event trees -- 6.3 Scenario analysis -- 6.4 Overview of human error modelling -- Part II Accident case studies -- 7 Organizational and management errors -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Flixborough chemical plant disaster -- 7.3 The capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise -- 7.4 Privatization of the railways -- References -- 8 Design errors -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The fire and explosion at BP Grangemouth -- 8.3 The sinking of the ferry 'Estonia' -- 8.4 The Abbeystead explosion -- References -- 9 Maintenance errors -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Engine failure on the Royal Flight -- 9.3 The railway accident at Hatfield -- 9.4 The railway accident at Potters Bar -- References -- 10 Active errors in railway operations -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Signals passed at danger -- 10.3 The train accident at Purley -- 10.4 The driver's automatic warning system -- 10.5 The Southall and Ladbroke Grove rail accidents -- 10.6 Human error analysis of signals passed at danger -- 10.7 Driver protection against SPADs -- References -- 11 Active errors in aviation -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The loss of flight KAL007 -- 11.3 The Kegworth accident -- References -- 12 Violations -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 The Chernobyl accident -- 12.3 The Airbus A320 crash at Mulhouse -- References -- 13 Incident response errors -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Fire on Swissair flight SR111 -- 13.3 The Channel Tunnel fire -- References -- 14 Conclusions -- 14.1 Human error and blame -- 14.2 Understanding human error -- 14.3 Human error in industry -- References -- Appendix: Train protection systems -- A.1 Introduction -- A.2 Protection against train collisions -- A.2.1 The time interval system -- A.2.2 The block system -- A.2.3 Multi-aspect signals -- A.2.4 The automatic warning system -- A.2.5 Train protection and warning system -- A.2.6 Automatic train protection -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- K -- L -- M -- N.
588 0 $aPrint version record.
520 $aUnderstand how to improve safety by focussing on systems, not people.
650 0 $aAccidents.
650 0 $aAccidents$xPrevention.
650 0 $aHuman engineering.
650 7 $aHEALTH & FITNESS$xSafety.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aAccidents.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00795270
650 7 $aAccidents$xPrevention.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00795276
650 7 $aHuman engineering.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00963014
650 17 $aFouten.$2gtt
650 17 $aOngevallen.$2gtt
650 17 $aErgonomie.$2gtt
650 17 $aBetrouwbaarheid.$2gtt
650 17 $aAnalyse (algemeen)$2gtt
655 0 $aElectronic books.
655 4 $aElectronic books.
776 08 $iPrint version:$aWhittingham, R.B. (Robert B.).$tBlame machine.$dAmsterdam ; Boston : Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2004$z0750655100$z9780750655101$w(DLC) 2003049531$w(OCoLC)53076816
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio14708691$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS