MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 04244cam a2200409I 4500
001 014159069-6
005 20141104130522.0
008 140131s2014 enk b 001 0 eng d
015 $aGBB473862$2bnb
016 7 $a016793988$2Uk
020 $a9780199647057
020 $a0199647054
035 0 $aocn869726261
040 $aERASA$beng$cERASA$dBTCTA$dBDX$dUKMGB$dYDXCP$dOCLCO$dCDX$dLTSCA$dCUD$dNLE$dCHVBK
050 4 $aB105.R4$bE67 2014
082 04 $a121.68$223
245 00 $aEmpty representations :$breference and non-existence /$cedited by Manuel García-Carpintero, Genoveva Martí.
250 $a1st ed.
260 $aOxford :$bOxford University Press,$c2014.
300 $avi, 359 p. ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520 8 $aIt is the linguistic job of singular terms to pick out the objects that we think or talk about. But what about singular terms that seem to fail to designate anything, because the objects they refer to don't exist? We can employ these terms in meaningful thought and talk, which suggests that they are succeeding in fulfilling their representational task. A team of leading experts presents new essays on the much-debated problem of empty reference and thought. 0In the 1960s and 1970s Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam initiated a revolution in the then standard conception of reference?a concept at the core of philosophical inquiry. The repercussions of the revolution, particularly felt in metaphysics and epistemology, were soon refined by other influential writers such as Tyler Burge, Gareth Evans, and John Perry. They argued that some linguistic and mental representations have contents individuated by what they are about?by ordinary referents of expressions such as proper names, indexicals, definite descriptions and common nouns, i.e. by planets, people or natural kinds. The view was at odds with a central philosophical presumption at that time: that cognitive and linguistic access to objective reality is indirect and accidental, mediated by general descriptive characterizations, the only constitutive semantic feature of the expressions; hence its ontological and epistemological repercussions. A turning-point in the debate about how linguistic and mental representation reach external contents concerned the nature of empty mental and linguistic representations, framed by means of the very same expressions crucially invoked in the Donnellan-Kaplan-Kripke-Putnam arguments. The papers in this volume address different aspects of reference and thought about the (apparently) non-existent.
505 0 $aPt. I Foundational Matters: Singular Thoughts and their Attribution -- 1. Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports / Cian Dorr -- 2. Two Dogmas of Russellianism / Robin Jeshion -- 3. Intersubjective Intentional Identity / Peter Pagin -- pt. II Accounts of Empty Representations -- 4. Vulcan Might Have Existed, and Neptune Not: On the Semantics of Empty Names / Peter Pagin -- 5. Content Relativism and the Problem of Empty Names / Frederick Kroon -- 6. Empty Singular Terms in the Mental File Framework / Francois Recanat -- 7. Things we Do with Empty Names: Objectual Representations, Non-Veridical Language Games, and Truth Similitude / Kenneth A. Taylor -- 8. Practical Solution to the Problem of Empty Singular Thought / Imogen Dickie -- pt. III Existence and Non-Existence -- 9. What is Existence? / Nathan Salmon -- 10. Problem of Negative Existentials Inadvertently Solved / Greg Ray -- pt. IV Fiction -- 11. Fictional Worlds and Fiction Operators / Mark Sainsbury -- 12. Many, But Almost Holmes? / Briggs Wright -- 13. Notions of Nothing / Stacie Friend -- 14. Fictional Realism and Negative Existentials / Tatjana von Solodkoff.
650 0 $aRepresentation (Philosophy)
650 0 $aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy.
650 7 $aReferenz.$2gnd
650 7 $aExistenz.$2gnd
650 7 $aNichts.$2gnd
650 7 $aFiktion.$2gnd
700 1 $aGarcía-Carpintero, Manuel.
700 1 $aMartí, Genoveva.
899 $a415_565471
988 $a20140910
906 $0OCLC