MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 03321cam a2200361Ia 4500
001 014091591-5
005 20140801093637.0
008 130917s2014 enka 000 0 eng d
010 $a 2014933966
016 7 $a016611917$2Uk
020 $a019965283X
020 $a9780199652839
020 $a9780199652822
020 $a0199652821
035 0 $aocn858526379
040 $aYDXCP$beng$cYDXCP$dBDX$dBTCTA$dUKMGB$dCDX$dOCLCO$dCUI$dOCLCQ
050 4 $aH61.15$b.S57 2014
082 4 $a300.1$b23
100 1 $aSkyrms, Brian.
245 10 $aSocial dynamics /$cBrian Skyrms.
260 $aOxford :$bOxford University Press,$c2014.
300 $axiv, 339 pages :$billustrations ;$c22 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
520 $a"Important essays by a leading expert in the field Trailblazing work at the scientific end of philosophy Brian Skyrms presents eighteen essays which apply adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory. Altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling are treated from this perspective. Correlation is seen to be of fundamental importance. Interactions with neighbors in space, on static networks, and on co-evolving dynamics networks are investigated. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics."--Back cover.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 $aPart I: Correlation and the Social Contract. Introduction to part I -- 1: Evolution and the Social Contract -- Part II: Importance of Dynamics. Introduction to part II -- 2: Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract -- 3: with Jason Alexander: Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? -- 4: Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models -- 5: Dynamics of Conformist Bias -- 6: Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics -- 7: with Jorge Pacheco, Francisco Santos and Max Souza: Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-person Stag Hunt Dilemmas -- 8: with Peter Vanderschraaf: Learning to Take Turns -- 9: with Kevin Zollman: Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms -- Part III: Dynamic Networks. Introduction to part III -- 10: with Robin Pemantle: Learning to Network -- 11: with Robin Pemantle: A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation -- 12: with Robin Pemantle: Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run -- 13: with Robin Pemantle: Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models -- Part IV: Dynamics of Signals. Introduction to part IV -- 14: with Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle and Stanislav Volkov: Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model -- 15: with Jason McKenzie Alexander and Sandy L. Zabell: Inventing New Signals -- 16: Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information -- 17: with Francesco Santos and Jorge Pacheco: Co-Evolution of Pre-Play Signaling and Cooperation -- 18: Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers.
650 0 $aSocial sciences$xPhilosophy.
899 $a415_566010
988 $a20140611
049 $aHLSS
906 $0OCLC