Record ID | harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.13.20150123.full.mrc:204160776:1734 |
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LEADER: 01734namaa2200289Ka 4500
001 013171560-7
005 20120702101957.0
008 120430s2011 maua |||||||eng|d
035 0 $aocn793214864
245 10 $aBarriers to household risk management :$bevidence from India /$cShawn Cole, Xavier Giné, Jeremy Tobacman, Petia Topalova, Robert Townsend, James Vickery.
250 $a[2nd rev.]
260 $a[Boston] :$bHarvard Business School,$cc2009, 2011, 2012.
300 $a36, [10], 8 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Harvard Business School ;$v09-116
500 $a"April 2009, revised November 2010, April 2012" -- Publisher's website.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 $aWhy do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to U.S. insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints and limited salience are significant non-price frictions that constrain demand. We suggest contract design improvements to mitigate these frictions.
700 1 $aCole, Shawn A.
700 1 $aGine, Xavier.
700 1 $aTobacman, Jeremy.
700 1 $aTopalova, Petia.
700 1 $aTownsend, Robert M., 1948-
700 1 $aVickery, James Ian, 1974-
710 2 $aHarvard Business School.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Harvard Business School) ;$v09-116.
988 $a20120430
906 $0MH