MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 01994namaa2200253Ka 4500
001 012752254-9
005 20110506193147.0
008 110426s2011 maua |||||||eng|d
035 0 $aocn721338050
100 1 $aCampbell, Dennis.
245 14 $aThe learning effects of monitoring /$cDennis Campbell, Mark Epstein, F. Asis Martinez-Jerez.
260 $a[Boston] :$bHarvard Business School,$cc2010, 2011.
300 $a42 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Harvard Business School ;$v11-053
500 $a"November 2010, revised April 2011" -- Publisher's website.
500 $a"Current draft: November 2011" -- added t.p.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 $aThis paper investigates the relationship between monitoring, decision-making, and learning among lower level employees. We exploit a field-research setting in which business units vary in the "tightness" with which they monitor employee decisions. We find that tighter monitoring gives rise to implicit incentives in the form of sharp increases in employee termination linked to "excessive" use of decision-rights. Consistent with these implicit incentives, we find that employees in tightly monitored business units are less likely than their loosely monitored counterparts to: (1) use decision-rights; and (2) adjust for local information, including historical performance data, in their decisions. These decision-making patterns are associated with large and systematic differences in learning rates across business units. Learning is concentrated in business units with "loose monitoring" and entirely absent in those with "tight monitoring". The results are consistent with an experimentation hypothesis in which tight monitoring of decisions leads to more control but less learning.
700 1 $aEpstein, Mark.
700 1 $aMartinez-Jerez, Asís.
710 2 $aHarvard Business School.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Harvard Business School) ;$v11-053.
988 $a20110426
906 $0MH