It looks like you're offline.
Open Library logo
additional options menu

MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

Record ID harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.12.20150123.full.mrc:138113158:1706
Source harvard_bibliographic_metadata
Download Link /show-records/harvard_bibliographic_metadata/ab.bib.12.20150123.full.mrc:138113158:1706?format=raw

LEADER: 01706cam a2200337Ia 4500
001 012120374-3
005 20091116133456.0
008 090925s2009 pau b f000 0 eng d
020 $a9781584874065
020 $a1584874066
035 0 $aocn225515786
035 0 $aocn439749837
040 $aAWC$cAWC$dIXA$dDOS
043 $aa-is---$ama-----$aap-----$aa-iq---$aa-ku---
050 4 $aUA104$b.T477 2009
100 1 $aTerrill, W. Andrew.
245 10 $aEscalation and intrawar deterrence during limited wars in the Middle East /$cW. Andrew Terrill.
260 $aCarlisle, PA :$bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$c2009.
300 $axiii, 112 p. ;$c23 cm.
500 $a"September 2009."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 95-112).
520 $aThis monograph analyzes military escalation and intrawar deterrence by examining two key wars where these concepts became especially relevant: the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A central conclusion of this monograph is that intrawar deterrence is an inherently fragile concept, and that the nonuse of weapons of mass destruction in both wars was the result of a number of positive factors that may not be repeated in future conflicts.
530 $aAlso available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
650 0 $aEscalation (Military science)$vCase studies.
650 0 $aDeterrence (Strategy)$vCase studies.
650 0 $aArab-Israeli conflict$y1967-1973.
650 0 $aPersian Gulf War, 1991.
710 2 $aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.
988 $a20091116
049 $aKSGG
906 $0OCLC