MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 01669nam a2200229Ka 4500
001 011986641-2
005 20090528150306.0
008 090528s2009 maua b 000|0 eng d
035 0 $aocn542094938
035 0 $aocn542094940
100 1 $aHagiu, Andrei,$d1977-
245 10 $aMonopolistic competition between differentiated products with demand for more than one variety /$cAndrei Hagiu.
260 $a[Boston] :$bHarvard Business School,$cc2009.
300 $a48 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Harvard Business School ;$v09-095
500 $a"April 2009"--Publisher's website.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 $aWe analyze the existence of pure strategy symmetric price equilibria in a generalized version of Salop (1979)'s circular model of competition between differentiated products - namely, we allow consumers to purchase more than one brand. When consumers purchase all varieties from which they derive non-negative net utility, there is no competition, so that each firm behaves like an unconstrained monopolist. When each consumers is interested in purchasing an exogenously given number (n) of varieties, we show that there is no pure strategy symmetric price equilibrium in general (for n > 2 with linear transportation costs). In turn, if the limitation on the number of varieties consumers purchase comes from a budget constraint then we obtain a multiplicity of symmetric price equilibria, which can be indexed by the number of varieties consumers purchase in equilibrium.
710 2 $aHarvard Business School.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Harvard Business School) ;$v09-095.
988 $a20090528
906 $0MH