MARC Record from harvard_bibliographic_metadata

LEADER: 01723nam a2200229Ka 4500
001 011820390-8
005 20090202150600.0
008 090202s2008 maua b 000|0 eng d
035 0 $aocn543515388
100 1 $aEdelman, Benjamin.
245 10 $aCPC/CPA hybrid bidding in a second price auction /$cBenjamin Edelman and Hoan Soo Lee.
260 $a[Boston :$bHarvard Business School],$cc2008.
300 $a20 p. :$bill. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aWorking paper / Harvard Business School ;$v09-074
500 $a"December 2008"--Publisher's web site.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 $aWe develop a model of online advertising in which each advertiser chooses from multiple advertising measurement metrics - paying either for each click on its ads (CPC), or for each purchase that follows an ad-click (CPA). Our analysis extends classic auction results by allowing players to make bids using two different pricing schemes, while the driving information for bidders' endogenous selection - the conversion rate - is hidden from the seller. We show that the advertisers with the most productive sites prefer to pay CPC, while advertisers with lower quality sites prefer to pay CPA - a result that may be viewed as counterintuitive since low quality sites cannot proudly tout their conversion rates. This result holds even if an ad platform's assessment of site quality is correct in expectation. We also show that by offering both CPC and CPA, an ad platform can weakly increase its revenues compared to offering either alternative alone.
700 1 $aLee, Hoan Soo.
710 2 $aHarvard Business School.
830 0 $aWorking paper (Harvard Business School) ;$v09-074.
988 $a20090202
906 $0MH