{"type": {"key": "/type/work"}, "title": "Externalities from Labor Mobility", "authors": [{"type": {"key": "/type/author_role"}, "author": {"key": "/authors/OL3454928A"}}, {"type": {"key": "/type/author_role"}, "author": {"key": "/authors/OL4614620A"}}], "description": {"type": "/type/text", "value": "This paper assumes that workers can move from a market with high unemployment to one with low unemployment at a cost. In principle. equilibrium mobility can be greater or less than the social optimum. For most plausible parameter values. however. mobility is too low. Intuitively. mobility has a beneficial externality: it helps workers remaining in the high-unemployment market by reducing competition for jobs. Mobility hurts workers in the market that movers join, but this effect is usually smaller."}, "key": "/works/OL46192145W", "latest_revision": 1, "revision": 1, "created": {"type": "/type/datetime", "value": "2026-11-10T13:51:47.154943"}, "last_modified": {"type": "/type/datetime", "value": "2026-11-10T13:51:47.154943"}}