{"title": "Exclusive dealing", "subjects": ["Competition", "Exclusive contracts", "Mathematical models"], "key": "/works/OL4457784W", "authors": [{"type": {"key": "/type/author_role"}, "author": {"key": "/authors/OL888362A"}}], "type": {"key": "/type/work"}, "description": {"type": "/type/text", "value": "In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant, anticompetitive, or efficiency-enhancing, depending upon the setting. More specifically, we exhibit the potential for anticompetitive effects in non-coincident markets (that is, markets other than the ones in which exclusive dealing is practiced), and we explore the potential for the enhancement of efficiency in a setting where common representation gives rise to incentive conflicts. In each instance, we describe the manner in which equilibrium outcomes would be altered by a ban on exclusive dealing. We demonstrate that a ban may have surprisingly subtle and unintended effects."}, "latest_revision": 3, "revision": 3, "created": {"type": "/type/datetime", "value": "2009-12-10T06:25:39.815108"}, "last_modified": {"type": "/type/datetime", "value": "2026-11-10T13:03:43.857510"}}