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We examine the profitability and implications of online discount vouchers, a relatively new marketing tool that offers consumers large discounts when they prepay for participating firms' goods and services. Within a model of repeat experience good purchase, we examine two mechanisms by which a discount voucher service can benefit affiliated firms: price discrimination and advertising. For vouchers to provide successful price discrimination, the valuations of consumers who have access to vouchers must generally be lower than those of consumers who do not have access to vouchers. Offering vouchers tends to be more profitable for firms which are patient or relatively unknown, and for firms with low marginal costs. Extensions to our model accommodate the possibilities of multiple voucher purchases and firm price re-optimization. Despite the potential benefits of online discount vouchers to certain firms in certain circumstances, our analysis reveals the narrow conditions in which vouchers are likely to increase firm profits.
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1
To Groupon or not to Groupon: the profitability of deep discounts
2014, Harvard Business School
in English
- Revised edition
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2
To Groupon or not to Groupon: the profitability of deep discounts
2011, Harvard Business School
in English
- 2nd rev.
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3
To Groupon or not to Groupon: the profitability of deep discounts
2011, Harvard Business School
in English
- Rev.
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4
To Groupon or not to Groupon: the profitability of deep discounts
2010, Harvard Business School
in English
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Book Details
Edition Notes
"December 2010. (Revised June 2011, October 2011, January 2014)."--Publisher's Web site.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 18-21).
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Work Description
We examine the profitability and implications of online discount vouchers, a new marketing tool that offers consumers large discounts when they prepay for participating merchants' goods and services. Within a model of repeat experience good purchase, we examine two mechanisms by which a discount voucher service can benefit affiliated merchants: price discrimination and advertising. For vouchers to provide successful price discrimination, the valuations of consumers who have access to vouchers must systematically differ from — and be lower than — those of consumers who do not have access to vouchers. Offering vouchers is more profitable for merchants which are patient or relatively unknown, and for merchants with low marginal costs. Extensions to our model accommodate the possibilities of multiple voucher purchases and merchant price re-optimization.