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August 23, 2011 | History

Policy with dispersed information 1 edition

Cover of: Policy with dispersed information | Marios Angeletos

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Policy with dispersed information
[by] George-Marios Angeletos [and] Alessandro Pavan

Published 2007 by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English.

About the Book

This paper studies policy in a class of economies in which information about commonly-relevant fundamentals -- such as aggregate productivity and demand conditions -- is dispersed and can not be centralized by the government. In these economies, the decentralized use of information can fail to be efficient either because of discrepancies between private and social payoffs, or because of informational externalities. In the first case, inefficiency manifests itself in excessive non-fundamental volatility (overreaction to common noise) or excessive cross-sectional dispersion (overreaction to idiosyncratic noise). In the second case, inefficiency manifests itself in suboptimal social learning (low quality of information contained in macroeconomic data, financial prices, and other indicators of economic activity). In either case, a novel role for policy is identified: the government can improve welfare by manipulating the incentives agents face when deciding how to use their available sources of information. Our key result is that this can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of marginal taxes on aggregate activity. This contingency permits the government to control the reaction of equilibrium to different types of noise, to improve the quality of information in prices and macro data, and, in overall, to restore efficiency in the decentralized use of information. Keywords: Optimal policy, private information, complementarities, information externalities, social learning, efficiency. JEL Classifications: C72, D62, D82.

Edition Notes

"October 30, 2007"--title page. -- "October 26, 2007"--abstract page.

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 48-50).

Abstract in HTML and working paper for download in PDF available via World Wide Web at the Social Science Research Network.

Series
Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 07-28, Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 07-28.

The Physical Object

Pagination
50 leaves ;
Number of pages
50

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL24976308M
Internet Archive
policywithdisper0728ange
OCLC/WorldCat
704276304

History Created August 23, 2011 · 1 revision Download catalog record: RDF / JSON

August 23, 2011 Created by ImportBot import new book