Regulatory choice with pollution and innovation

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Regulatory choice with pollution and innovati ...
Charles D. Kolstad
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Last edited by MARC Bot
September 25, 2020 | History

Regulatory choice with pollution and innovation

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"This paper develops a simple model of a polluting industry and an innovating firm. The polluting industry is faced with regulation and costly abatement. Regulation may be taxes or marketable permits. The innovating firm invests in R&D and develops technologies which reduce the cost of pollution abatement. The innovating firm can patent this innovation and use a licensing fee to generate revenue. In a world of certainty, the first best level of innovation and abatement can be supported by either a pollution tax or a marketable permit. However, the returns to the innovator from innovation are not the same under the two regimes. A marketable permit system allows the innovator to capture all of the gains to innovation; a tax system involves sharing the gains of innovation between the innovator and the polluting industry"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Publish Date
Language
English

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Edition Availability
Cover of: Regulatory choice with pollution and innovation
Regulatory choice with pollution and innovation
2010, National Bureau of Economic Research
Electronic resource in English

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Book Details


Published in

Cambridge, MA

Edition Notes

Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/28/2010.

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Series
NBER working paper series -- working paper 16303, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16303.

Classifications

Library of Congress
HB1

The Physical Object

Format
Electronic resource

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL24485129M
LCCN
2010656304

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Download catalog record: RDF / JSON
September 25, 2020 Edited by MARC Bot import existing book
December 1, 2010 Created by ImportBot initial import