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Last edited by WorkBot
January 29, 2010 | History

International trade, minimum quality standards and the prisoners' dilemma 1 edition

International trade, minimum quality standards and the prisoners' dile ...
Dimitra Petropoulou

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International trade, minimum quality standards and the prisoners' dilemma
Dimitra Petropoulou.

Published 2008 by Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science in London .
Written in English.

About the Book

Unilateral minimum quality standards are endogenously determined as the outcome of a non-cooperative standard-setting game between the governments of two countries. Cross-country externalities from the implementation of minimum quality standards are shown to give rise to a Prisoners' Dilemma structure in the incentives of policy-makers leading to inefficient policy outcomes. The role of minimum quality standards as non-tariff barriers is examined and the scope for mutual gains from reciprocal adjustment in minimum standards analysed. The analysis delivers four results. First, there exist four unregulated Nash equilibria in minimum standards, two symmetric and two asymmetric, depending on the quality ranking of firms in each market. The analysis establishes that in all four cases, unilaterally selected minimum quality standards are inefficient as a result of cross-country externalities. Second, minimum quality standards are shown to operate as non-tariff barriers to trade. Third, the world welfare maximising symmetric standard can be reached through reciprocal adjustments in national minimum standards from either of the two symmetric Nash equilibria. Finally, the scope for mutually beneficial cooperation is shown to be significantly restricted when cross-country externalities are asymmetric. Asymmetric externalities make a cooperative agreement at the world optimum infeasible.

Edition Notes

Title from PDF file (viewed on Oct. 10, 2008).

"February 2008."

Includes bibliographical references.

Also available in print.

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Series
CEP discussion paper -- no. 858

Classifications

Library of Congress
HC10

The Physical Object

Format
Electronic resource

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL22649224M
LC Control Number
2008613821

History Created December 11, 2009 · 2 revisions Download catalog record: RDF / JSON

January 29, 2010 Edited by WorkBot add more information to works
December 11, 2009 Created by WorkBot add works page