An edition of Putting Auction Theory to Work (1998)

Putting Auction Theory to Work

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Last edited by MARC Bot
December 17, 2022 | History
An edition of Putting Auction Theory to Work (1998)

Putting Auction Theory to Work

  • 0 Ratings
  • 1 Want to read
  • 0 Currently reading
  • 0 Have read

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Author is the world's leading active scholar on auctions, internationally celebrated for his research on auction design
The most comprehensive and up-to-date book on the subject; author answers his critics in the literature
A must-buy for graduate students
source: https://www.cambridge.org/nl/academic/subjects/economics/microeconomics/putting-auction-theory-work?format=PB&isbn=9780521536721

Publish Date
Language
English
Pages
392

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Previews available in: English

Edition Availability
Cover of: PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK.
PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK.
2004, CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, Cambridge University Press
Cover of: Putting Auction Theory to Work
Putting Auction Theory to Work
2004, Cambridge University Press
Paperback in English
Cover of: Putting Auction Theory to Work
Putting Auction Theory to Work
2004, Cambridge University Press
Hardcover in English
Cover of: Putting Auction Theory to Work
Putting Auction Theory to Work
2000, Cambridge University Press
E-book in English
Cover of: Putting auction theory to work

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Book Details


Published in

Cambridge

First Sentence

"To most telecommunications industry commentators, the main significance of the US spectrum auctions was that a market mechanism was used at all."

Table of Contents

Section 1. Getting to Work:
1. Politics sets the stage
2. Designing for multiple goals
3. Comparing seller revenues
4. The academic critics
5. Plan for this book
Part I. The Mechanism Design Approach
Section 2. Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanisms:
6. Formulation
7. Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies
8. Balancing the budget
9. Uniqueness
10. Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction
11. Conclusion
Section 3. The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence:
12. Hottelling's lemma
13. The envelope theorem in integral form
14. Quasi-linear payoffs
15. Conclusion
Section 4. Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences:
16. The single crossing conditions
17. Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies
18. Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model
19. Expected-revenue maximizing auctions
20. Conclusion
Section 5. Interdependence of Types and Values:
21. Which models and assumptions are 'useful'?
22. Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions
23. Wilson's drainage tract model
24. Correlated types model interdependent values
25. Conclusion
Section 6. Auctions in Context:
26. The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant
27. Symmetric models with costly entry
28. Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition
29. After the bidding ends
30. Conclusion
Part II. Multi-Unit Auctions
Section 7. Uniform Price Auctions:
31. Uniform price sealed bid auctions
32. Simultaneous ascending auctions
33. Conclusion
Section 8. Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding:
34. Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems
35. Bernheim–Whinston first-price package auctions
36. Ausubel–Milgrom ascending proxy auctions
37. Conclusion.

Edition Notes

Series
Churchill Lectures in Economics
Copyright Date
2004

Classifications

Dewey Decimal Class
381/.17/01
Library of Congress
HF5476.M55 2003

The Physical Object

Format
Paperback
Pagination
xxi, 368p.
Number of pages
392
Dimensions
8.9 x 6 x 0.9 inches
Weight
1.1 pounds

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL7745226M
ISBN 10
0521536723
ISBN 13
9780521536721
LCCN
2003051544
OCLC/WorldCat
803550475
Amazon ID (ASIN)
0521536723
Google
vPWUAwAAQBAJ
Library Thing
1709187
Goodreads
673058

Work Description

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

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December 17, 2022 Edited by MARC Bot import existing book
October 12, 2020 Edited by Tom Morris merge authors
September 13, 2020 Edited by MARC Bot import existing book
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December 10, 2009 Created by WorkBot add works page