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MARC Record from marc_oapen

Record ID marc_oapen/convert_oapen_20201117.mrc:30706943:2928
Source marc_oapen
Download Link /show-records/marc_oapen/convert_oapen_20201117.mrc:30706943:2928?format=raw

LEADER: 02928namaa2200409uu 450
001 http://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/26042
005 20190120
020 $a9780262036269
041 0 $aEnglish
042 $adc
072 7 $aKCN$2bicssc
100 1 $aCramton, Peter$4edt
700 1 $aMacKay, David JC$4edt
700 1 $aOckenfels, Axel$4edt
700 1 $aStoft, Steven$4edt
700 1 $aCramton, Peter$4oth
700 1 $aMacKay, David JC$4oth
700 1 $aOckenfels, Axel$4oth
700 1 $aStoft, Steven$4oth
245 10 $aGlobal Carbon Pricing : The Path to Climate Cooperation
260 $aCambridge$bThe MIT Press$c2017
300 $a1 electronic resource (268 p.)
506 0 $aOpen Access$2star$fUnrestricted online access
520 $aWhy the traditional “pledge and review” climate agreements have failed, and how carbon pricing, based on trust and reciprocity, could succeed.After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a “pledge and review” approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an alternate model for climate agreements, drawing on the work of the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and others. They show that a “common commitment” scheme is more effective than an “individual commitment” scheme; the latter depends on altruism while the former involves reciprocity (“we will if you will”).The contributors propose that global carbon pricing is the best candidate for a reciprocal common commitment in climate negotiations. Each country would commit to placing charges on carbon emissions sufficient to match an agreed global price formula. The contributors show that carbon pricing would facilitate negotiations and enforcement, improve efficiency and flexibility, and make other climate policies more effective. Additionally, they analyze the failings of the 2015 Paris climate conference.ContributorsRichard N. Cooper, Peter Cramton, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Gollier, Éloi Laurent, David JC MacKay, William Nordhaus, Axel Ockenfels, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Steven Stoft, Jean Tirole, Martin L. Weitzman
540 $aCreative Commons$fby-nc-nd/4.0/$2cc$4http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
546 $aEnglish
650 7 $aEnvironmental economics$2bicssc
653 $aemissions
653 $aclean air
653 $aclimate change
653 $aenvironmental economics
653 $aCO2
653 $agreenhouse gases
653 $aParis Agreement
653 $afree rider problem
856 40 $awww.oapen.org$uhttps://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/84e0bec2-093c-45b9-a04b-f9181b73ccde/10914.pdf$70$zOAPEN Library: download the publication
856 40 $awww.oapen.org$uhttp://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/26042$70$zOAPEN Library: description of the publication