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MARC Record from Library of Congress

Record ID marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part28.utf8:233882716:4804
Source Library of Congress
Download Link /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part28.utf8:233882716:4804?format=raw

LEADER: 04804cam a22002654a 4500
001 2001058066
003 DLC
005 20151201080214.0
008 011116s2002 enk b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2001058066
020 $a0199243824
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
042 $apcc
050 00 $aB808.9$b.P36 2002
082 00 $a126$221
100 1 $aPapineau, David,$d1947-
245 10 $aThinking about consciousness /$cDavid Papineau.
260 $aOxford :$bClarendon Press ;$aNew York :$bOxford University Press,$c2002.
300 $axiv, 266 p. ;$c23 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 257-262) and index.
505 8 $aMachine generated contents note: Introduction I -- I Mystery-What Mystery? I -- 2 The Intuition of Distinctness 2 -- 3 A Need for Therapy 3 -- 4 Ontological Monism, Conceptual Dualism 4 -- 5 Understanding the Intuition of Distinctness 6 -- 6 The Details of Materialism 8 -- 7 The Plan of the Book 9 -- I The Case for Materialism 13 -- x. i Introduction 13 -- 1.2 The Causal Argument I 7 -- 1.3 The Ontology of Causes 18 -- 1.4 Epiphenomenalism and Pre-established Harmony 21 -- I.5 Accepting Overdetermination 26 -- I.6 Functionalism and Epiphobia 28 -- 1.7 A Possible Cure for Epiphobia 32 -- I.8 Intuition and Supervenience 36 -- I.9 An Argument from A Priori Causal Roles 38 -- I.Io What is 'Physics'? 40 -- I. II The Completeness of Physics 44 -- 2 Conceptual Dualism 47 -- 2.1 Introduction 47 -- 2.2 Jackson's Knowledge Argument 50 -- 2.3 Denying Any Difference 51 -- 2.4 Imaginative Re-creation 56 -- 2.5 Introspective Classification 57 -- 2.6 The Ability Hypothesis 59 -- 2.7 Indexicality and Phenomenal Concepts 63 -- 2.8 The Contingency of Learning from Experience 67 -- 2.9 Imagination and Introspection 69 -- 2.10 Further Issues 71 -- 3 The Impossibility of Zombies 7 3 -- 3.1 Introduction 75 -- 3.2 Epistemology versus Metaphysics 77 -- 3.3 The Appearance of Contingency 77 -- 3.4 Explaining the Appearance of Contingency 79 -- 3.5 Referring via Contingent Properties 8 -- 3.6 A Different Explanation 85 -- 3.7 Thinking Impossible Things 88 -- 3.8 Conceivability and Possibility 9 -- 3.9 The Intuition of Distinctness 93 -- 4 Phenomenal Concepts 96 -- 4. Introduction 96 -- 4.2 Psychological, Phenomenal, and Everyday Concepts 97 -- 4.3 Phenomenal Properties Provide their own 'Modes of -- Presentation' 10o3 -- 4.4 World-Directed Perceptual Re-creation and Classification Io6 -- 4.5 Perceptual Concepts Io8 -- 4.6 How Do Perceptual Concepts Refer? iIo -- 4.7 The Phenomenal Co-option of Perceptual Concepts 14 -- 4.8 A Quotational Model I 6 -- 4.9 Indexicality and the Quotational Model 122 -- 4.0o The Causal Basis of Phenomenal Reference 1 25 -- 4. Phenomenal Concepts and Privacy 127 -- 4.12 First-Person Incorrigibility I33 -- 4.I 3 Third-Person Uses of Phenomenal Concepts 139 -- 5 The Explanatory Gap 141 -- 5. Introduction 141 -- 5.2 Mark Twain, Samuel Clemens, and Intuitions of Gaps 143 -- 5.3 Reduction, Roles, and Explanation 147 -- 5.4 Does Materialism Require the Physical Truths to Imply all -- the Truths? 150 -- 5.5 An Epistemological Gap 155 -- 5.6 Conclusion I6o -- 6 The Intuition of Distinctness 6 I -- 6. Introduction 6 I -- 6.2 Is an Explanation Already to Hand? 162 -- 6.3 Does Conceptual Dualism Explain the Intuition of -- Distinctness? 164 -- 6.4 Nagel's Footnote I67 -- 6.5 The Antipathetic Fallacy I69 -- 6.6 Do Phenomenal Concepts Resemble their Objects? I7I -- 7 Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal -- Consciousness 175 -- 7.1 Introduction 175 -- 7.2 The Limitations of Consciousness Research I76 -- 7.3 Phenomenal and Psychological Research I79 -- 7.4 Subjects' First-Person Reports I8I -- 7.5 Consciousness-as-Such 184 -- 7.6 Methodological Impotence I87 -- 7.7 Further Alternatives 9 I -- 7.8 Vague Phenomenal Concepts I96 -- 7.9 Vagueness Defended I99 -- 7.Io Theories of Consciousness-as-Such 202 -- 7.1 Actualist HOT Theories 204 -- 7.12 Attention 208 -- 7.13 The Dispositional HOT theory 210 -- 7.14 Methodological Meltdown 215 -- 7.15 Representational Theories of Consciousness 221 -- 7.16 Vagueness and Consciousness-as-Such 225 -- 7.17 Conclusion 228 -- Appendix: The History of The Completeness of Physics 232 -- A.I Introduction 232 -- A.2 Descartes and Leibniz 234 -- A.3 Newtonian Physics 237 -- A .4 The Conservation of Energy 243 -- A.5 Conservative Animism 249 -- A.6 The Death of Emergentism 253 -- A.7 Conclusion 255 -- References 257 -- Index 263.
650 0 $aConsciousness.
856 41 $3Table of contents only$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy022/2001058066.html
856 42 $3Publisher description$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0611/2001058066-d.html
856 42 $3Contributor biographical information$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0725/2001058066-b.html