| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-011.mrc:317383416:3558 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-011.mrc:317383416:3558?format=raw |
LEADER: 03558pam a22003134a 4500
001 5498544
005 20221110050103.0
008 050613t20062006maua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2005050499
020 $a0262033429 (alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)OCM60671903
035 $a(NNC)5498544
035 $a5498544
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dOCLCQ$dC#P$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
050 00 $aHF5476$b.C65 2006
082 00 $a381/.17$222
245 00 $aCombinatorial auctions /$cedited by Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c[2006], ©2006.
300 $axv, 649 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes.
505 00 $tForeword /$rVernon L. Smith -- $tIntroduction to combinatorial auctions /$rPeter Cramton, Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg -- $g1.$tThe lovely but lonely Vickrey auction /$rLawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom -- $g2.$tIterative combinatorial auctions /$rDavid C. Parkes -- $g3.$tAscending proxy auctions /$rLawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom -- $g4.$tSimultaneous ascending auctions /$rPeter Cramton -- $g5.$tThe clock-proxy auction : a practical combinatorial auction design /$rLawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom -- $g6.$tPAUSE : a computationally tractable combinatorial auction /$rAilsa Land, Susan Powell and Richard Steinberg -- $g7.$tPseudonymous bidding in combinatorial auctions /$rMakoto Yokoo -- $g8.$tFrom the assignment model to combinatorial auctions /$rSushil Bikhchandani and Joseph M. Ostroy -- $g9.$tBidding languages for combinatorial auctions /$rNoam Nisan -- $g10.$tPreference elicitation in combinatorial auctions /$rTuomas Sandholm and Craig Boutilier -- $g11.$tThe communication requirements of combinatorial allocation problems /$rIlya Segal -- $g12.$tThe winner determination problem /$rDaniel Lehmann, Rudolf Muller and Tuomas Sandholm -- $g13.$tTractable cases of the winner determination problem /$rRudolf Muller -- $g14.$tOptimal winner determination algorithms /$rTuomas Sandholm -- $g15.$tIncentive compatibility in computationally feasible combinatorial auctions /$rAmir Ronen -- $g16.$tNoncomputational approaches to mitigating computational problems in combinatorial auctions /$rAleksandar Pekec and Michael H. Rothkopf -- $g17.$tObservations and near-direct implementations of the ascending proxy auction /$rKarla Hoffman, Dinesh Menon, Susara van den Heever and Thomas Wilson -- $g18.$tA test suite for combinatorial auctions /$rKevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham -- $g19.$tEmpirical hardness models for combinatorial auctions /$rKevin Leyton-Brown, Eugene Nudelman and Yoav Shoham -- $g20.$tAuctions for the safe, efficient, and equitable allocation of airspace system resources /$rMichael O. Ball, George L. Donohue and Karla Hoffman -- $g21.$tCombinatorial auctions for truckload transportation /$rChris Caplice and Yossi Sheffi -- $g22.$tAuctioning bus routes : the London experience /$rEstelle Cantillon and Martin Pesendorfer -- $g23.$tIndustrial procurement auctions /$rMartin Bichler, Andrew Davenport, Gail Honer and Jayant Kalagnanm.
650 0 $aAuctions.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009444
700 1 $aCramton, Peter C.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no95033748
700 1 $aShoham, Yoav.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n87873273
700 1 $aSteinberg, Richard.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n89673714
852 00 $boff,bus$hHF5476$i.C65 2006