Israel and Jordan, even though self-proclaimed enemies of one another, practiced a relationship of interdependence based on corresponding interests. In the years following the 1967 war, these two countries' fates were delicately intertwined because of many factors like mutual reliance on natural resources (especially water) and parallel interests in the subordination of the Palestinian national movement.

These conditions of commonality led to extensive ties between the two countries and approximated a state of de facto peace that - ironically - made an official peace treaty almost impossible to sign. A formal peace treaty would have required not only Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank but also Jordan's acknowledgment of the clandestine contacts between the two formal enemies.

Yehuda Lukacs gives us an account of how this relationship changed in 1988 when Jordan disengaged from the West Bank. This event, combined with the Palestinian uprising and the Gulf War, paved the way for Israel and Jordan in 1994 to sign the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. By systematically examining the impact of functional cooperation between two official enemies, Lukacs makes an important contribution to Middle East studies and international conflict resolution.