An edition of Reasons and persons (1984)

Reasons and persons

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Cover of: Reasons and persons by Derek Parfit
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An edition of Reasons and persons (1984)

Reasons and persons

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  • 0 Ratings
  • 17 Want to read
  • 2 Currently reading
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Publish Date
Publisher
Clarendon Press
Language
English
Pages
543

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Previews available in: English

Subjects
Rationalism, Ethics, Self, Morale, Moi (Psychologie), PHILOSOPHY, Ethics & Moral Philosophy, Rationalisme, Rationaliteit, Social, Handelingstheorie, Theorieën, Identiteit, Moraal, Moi (psychologie), Manactionsreasons - philosophical perspectives, Bj1012 .p39 1984, 170

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Cover of: Reasons and persons
Reasons and persons
1986, Clarendon, Clarendon Press
in English
Libraries near you: WorldCat
Cover of: Reasons and persons
Reasons and persons
1984, Oxford University Press
Libraries near you: WorldCat
Cover of: Reasons and persons
Reasons and persons
1984, Clarendon Press
in English
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Book Details

Published in

Oxford [Oxfordshire]

Table of Contents

1. Self-Defeating Theories
1. Theories That Are Indirectly Self-Defeating Page 3
1. The Self-interest Theory Page 3
2. How S Can Be Indirectly Self-defeating Page 5
3. Does S Tell Us To Be Never Self-denying? Page 7
4. Why S Does Not Fail In Its Own Terms Page 11
5. Could It Be Rational To Cause Onself to Act Irrationally? Page 12
6. How S Implies that We Cannot Avoid Acting Irrationally Page 13
7. An Argument For Rejecting S When It Comflicts With Morality Page 17
8. Why This Argument Fails Page 19
9. How S Might Be Self-Effacing Page 23
10. How Consequentialism Is Indirectly Self-defeating Page 24
11. Why C Does Not Fail In Its Own Terms Page 28
12. The Ethics of Fantasy Page 29
13. Collective Consequentialism Page 30
14. Blameless Wrongdoing Page 31
15. Could It Be Impossible to Avoid Acting Wrongly? Page 35
16. Could It Be Right to Cause Oneself to Act Wrongly? Page 37
17. How C Might Be Self-Effacing Page 40
18. The Objection that Assumes Inflexibility Page 43
19. Can Being Rational or Moral Be a Mere Means? Page 45
20. Conclusions Page 49
2. Practical Dilemmas Page 53
21. Why C Cannot Be Directly Self-defeating Page 53
22. How Theories Can Be Directly Self-defeating Page 55
23. Prisoner's Dilemmas and Public Goods Page 56
24. The Practical Problem and its Solutions Page 62
3. Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics Page 67
25. The Share-of-the-Total View Page 67
26. Ignoring the Effects of Sets of Acts Page 70
27. Ignoring Small Chances Page 73
28. Ignoring Small or Imperceptible Effects Page 75
29. Can There Be Imperceptible Harms and Benefits? Page 78
30. Overdetermination Page 82
31. Rational Altruism Page 83
4. Theories That Are Directly Self-Defeating Page 87
32. In Prisoner's Dilemmas, Does S Fail in Its Own Terms? Page 88
33. Another Bad Defence of Morality Page 91
34. Intertemporal Dilemmas Page 92
35. A Bad Defence of S Page 93
36. How Common-Sense Morality Is Directly Self-Defeating Page 95
37. The Five Parts of a Moral Theory Page 98
38. How We Can Revise Common-Sense Morality so that It Would Not Be Self-Defeating Page 100
39. Why We Ought to Revise Common-Sense Morality Page 103
40. A Simpler Revision Page 108
5. Two Possibilities Page 111
41. Reducing the DIstance between M and C Page 111
42. The First Possibility Page 112
43. Work to be Done Page 113
44. The Second Possibility Page 114
2. Rationality and Time
6. The Best Objection to the Self-Interest Theory Page 117
45. The Present-aim Theory Page 117
46. Can Desires Be Intrinsically Irrational, or Rationally Required? Page 120
47. Three Competing Theories Page 126
48. Psychological Egoism Page 127
49. The Self-interest Theory and Morality Page 129
50. My First Argument Page 130
51. The S-Theorist's First Reply Page 132
52. Why Temporal Neutrality Is Not the Issue Between S and P Page 133

Edition Notes

Bibliography: p. [533]-540.
Includes index.

Classifications

Dewey Decimal Class
170
Library of Congress
BJ1012 .P39 1984

The Physical Object

Pagination
xv, 543 p. :
Number of pages
543

ID Numbers

Open Library
OL3172889M
ISBN 10
0198246153
LCCN
83015139
Goodreads
3016983

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April 6, 2014 Edited by ImportBot Added IA ID.
April 16, 2010 Edited by bgimpertBot Added goodreads ID.
April 13, 2010 Edited by Open Library Bot Linked existing covers to the edition.
December 12, 2009 Edited by WorkBot link works
April 1, 2008 Created by an anonymous user Imported from Scriblio MARC record.