MARC Record from Scriblio

LEADER: 02019cam 22003017a 4500
001 2004617313
003 DLC
005 20041110073343.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 041110s2004 mnu sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2004617313
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aBoldrin, Michele,$d1956-
245 10 $aRent-seeking and innovation$h[electronic resource] /$cMichele Boldrin and David K. Levine.
260 $a[Minneapolis, Minn.] :$bFederal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,$c[2004]
490 1 $aFederal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;$v347
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 11/10/2004.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy of intellectual property, analyzing the trade-off between private and public rent-seeking. While it is true in principle that public rent-seeking may be a substitute for private rent-seeking, it is not true that this results always either in less private rent-seeking or in a welfare improvement. When the public sector itself is selfish and behaves rationally, we may experience the worst of public and private rent-seeking together"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
650 0 $aTechnological innovations.
650 0 $aIntellectual property.
700 1 $aLevine, David K.
830 0 $aStaff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;$v347.
856 40 $uhttp://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/sr/sr347.html