This paper rejects the notion that onsite inspection provisions, such as the 'historic' terms of the INF treaty, necessarily insure verification. The principles and processes of verification are examined, as are two failed post- World War I arms control measures that featured intrusive inspection. The Treaty of Versailles was ignored by the Germans, while its replacement, the Anglo- American Naval Treaty, fared no better; both were marked by Allied wishful thinking. A review of post World-War II agreements relative to charges of Soviet noncompliance reveal more ambiguities than actual violations, although the in famous radar near Krasnovarsk fails to be explained away. Discussion of the INF Treaty centers on on-site inspection provisions, that are described as being too costly and too complex to properly implement, as well as offering the Soviet Union unreasonable opportunities for collateral intelligence collection. The author suggests the United States rebuild its counterintelligence assets, attempt to resolve compliance issues through such forums as the Standing Consulting Committee, and form arms control policy in the contest of a comprehensive international security policy--one driven only peripherally by the political requirements of the moment. (SDW)